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The relationship of regionalism to globalisation is modelled in the literature either as open 
regionalism aimed at integration with the global market or as a project of resistance to global 
market forces. While the model of open regionalism is underwritten by the liberal political 
economy perspective on IPE, the resistance model pays close attention to domestic politics. 
Although they offer considerable insights into the globalisation-regionalism relationship, the 
former model lacks a realistic notion of both the international and domestic political economies, 
while the latter adopts a somewhat Euro-centric view of dynamics at the domestic level based on 
the European welfare state. This paper argues that the economic realist perspective on IPE 
combined with an approach to domestic politics that pays especial attention to historical and 
political context offers additional insights into the globalisation-regionalism relationship. First, it 
makes it possible to (a) identify two variants of open regionalism (a neoliberal variant and an 
FDI model), and (b) to advance a fourth ideal-type model of the globalisation-regionalism 
relationship, namely developmental regionalism. The latter model, which also draws on strategic 
trade theory, involves making a conceptual distinction between foreign-owned and domestic-
owned capital, a distinction that is presently missed in the literature and that may be relevant in 
settings where domestic-owned capital plays crucial political/social roles. Second, it suggests 
that it is primarily domestic political economic dynamics that determines which of these models 
emerges in response to globalisation, although the push to regionalism may have initially come 
from systemic forces. The domestic level is consequently a key level of analysis in explanations 
of regionalism.  
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Although globalisation has been defined in a variety of ways,2 a common theme is that it 
generates increasingly intense interactions between nation-states and societies through flows of 
goods, money, people, ideas, images and information, in the process making territorial 
boundaries less salient (Hurrell 1995: 54). This makes the recent growth of economic 
regionalism amidst globalisation rather a paradoxical phenomenon, and has generated 
considerable scholarly interest in the relationship between them. While globalisation tends to de-
emphasise boundaries, regionalism3 appears to be an attempt by state actors at re-imposing them 
at a different level, consequently creating a new, larger space out of smaller territorial spaces 
bounded in nation-states although the larger space is rarely if ever a new political unit or super-
state.4 How do we explain a relationship between two seemingly opposing phenomena? 
 
Recent works in IPE identify two ways in which regionalism might emerge as an outcome of, or 
a response to globalisation, depending on whether the relationship is conceived of as being 
accommodating or antagonistic. The former – open regionalism – is the dominant model in the 
literature, conceptualising regionalism as a way station to globalisation, a means through which 
policymakers enhance the participation of their respective national economies in globalisation 
processes. It is a model that is informed by the liberal political economy perspective on IPE. A 
contrasting model, privileging domestic political dynamics, explains regionalism as an attempt 
by state or other domestic actors to resist the negative effects of globalisation. The main aim in 
this case is to preserve domestic social, including distributive agendas that are threatened by 
globalisation. Although providing considerable insight into developments in the contemporary 
world economy, these ideal-type models suffer two weaknesses, which consequently have 
implications for how they allow for the interpretation of empirical trends. Briefly, these models 
lack an adequate conception of the relationship of the state to domestic society on the one hand 
and to global market actors and other states on the other. These limitations, however, can be 
addressed by using a more appropriate theoretical tool, namely an analytical framework that 
                                                           
2 See Scholte (2000: 44-46).  
3 Regionalism is defined here as a states-led project to coordinate policies in a given region. It is, thus, contrasted 
with regionalisation, which is defined as a process of regional integration driven primarily by markets, or more 
specifically, by the actions of corporate/economic actors. See Wyatt-Walter (1995). Notwithstanding their 
conceptual and practical linkages, this paper focuses on regionalism.  
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integrates the economic realist theoretical perspective on IPE with domestic politics. This 
approach, which is discussed in detail in this paper, offers substantial analytical purchase in 
explaining why regionalism may emerge out of globalisation and the forms it might take.  
 
Before embarking on this discussion, it is necessary as a first step to advance a conception of 
economic globalisation that will help to extend our understanding of how globalisation might 
relate to regionalism as well as provide a frame of reference when operationalising the concept 
for empirical analysis. In the next section, globalisation is conceived of as a multi-dimensional 
structural phenomenon, which takes us beyond the still fairly common but rather narrow, liberal 
economic interpretation of globalisation as the extent and depth of economic integration between 
countries.  
 
CONCEPTUALISING GLOBALISATION  
 
In conceptualising economic globalisation, three key features are salient. The first stresses the 
notion of globalisation as structure. Structure asserts or manifests its effects on actors through 
agency, or the policy choices and actions of a variety of agents – governments, businesses, 
international organisations and individuals. Not only does this particular characterisation reject 
the idea of globalisation as an inexorable economic force it also introduces into the equation the 
scope for human agency to resist, control or manage globalisation.  
 
The second emphasises the multi-dimensional nature of globalisation, involving not just material 
economic factors but also ideational/cognitive and institutional forces operating in the world 
political economy (Higgott 2000: 70). Consequently, the pressures of globalisation are not solely 
manifested through the material economic changes associated with global market competition, 
such as through shifts in prices, market shares or profit rates, they can also emerge through 
cognitive and ideational influences as well as through institutional prescriptions and 
proscriptions. The interplay between these three dimensions of globalisation – the material, 
ideational and institutional – constitutes the ‘context of habits, pressures, expectations and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 Even the European Union, the most advanced regionalist project in the world economy cannot yet be termed a 
super-state or political entity. It continues to remain an inter-governmental project although it has a high level of 
institutionalisation and supranational governance mechanisms. 
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constraints within which actions take place’ (Cox 1981/96: 97-98). Governments, businesses and 
other social groups have to respond to these forces in one way or another, but they cannot ignore 
them.  In other words, even if states participate only marginally in world economic activities, that 
does not mean they are not ‘part’ of globalisation, or unaffected by it. They are still very much 
subject to the forces of globalisation, which structure the environment in which these states are 
located. Conceptualised in this manner, globalisation is clearly much more than the sum of 
economic interactions and interdependencies between countries.  
 
The third feature of globalisation, emphasised by Scholte (1997b: 431), is its tendency to 
disengage human activity from territory. Hughes (2000: 4) suggests that globalisation is 
qualitatively distinct from internationalisation and liberalisation, two phenomenon often 
conflated with globalisation, because of its potential to ‘reconfigure social space away from and 
beyond notions of delineated territory’ (Hughes, 2000: 4). It is important, however, to avoid the 
‘hyper’ globalisation thesis that the world is moving inexorably towards a borderless world.5 The 
‘de-territorialisation’ that some argue to be the essential feature of globalisation is still a limited 
phenomenon, with national borders continuing to constrain the unfettered flow of global market 
forces.6 ‘De-territorialisation’ is perhaps confined largely to the world of global financial flows 
and the internet where finance and information flow instantaneously around the globe 
unconstrained by territorial borders and removed from territorial space. Nevertheless, Hughes 
raises a crucial point about the tendency of globalisation to reconfigure social, including 
economic space beyond prevailing notions of territoriality, namely nation-states. But, what 
exactly is it about globalisation that has the potential to reconfigure economic space? More 
specifically, how is economic space being reconfigured and how might this relate to 
regionalism? A closer look at the constituent dimensions of globalisation is instructive in this 
regard. 
 
The Material Dimension: The Changing Dynamics of Competition  
Historical similarities exist in patterns of trade, finance, and production between earlier periods 
and the present, post-1970s world economy, which is argued to represent most clearly the 
                                                           
5 Ohmae (1990, 1995) is the most notable advocate of this thesis.  
6 The notion of ‘de-territorialisation’ comes from Scholte (1997b: 431).  
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globalisation period (Oman 1994: 33).7 Yet, many students of globalisation point to the sharp 
differences in the volume, scope, speed, clustering and depth of the processes and interactions in 
the world economy between the two periods (Petrella, 1996: 64-66; Higgott, 2000: 70). More to 
the point, contemporary global linkages are argued to be ‘organically different’ due to changes in 
the ‘manner in which firms organise production and both cooperate and compete with each 
other.8 This is a valuable point, because it draws attention to underlying firm-level dynamics that 
underpin globalisation processes and which drive the tendency to reconfigure economic space.  
 
One of the most important driving forces of globalisation is the diffusion and adoption of the 
post-fordist or flexible model of corporate and industrial organisation, particularly in the post-
1970s world economy (Oman 1994: 83-99).9 Flexible production systems increasingly underpin 
the growing prominence of functionally integrated transnational production patterns that has 
been noted in the contemporary period (Dunning 1993: 4; Oman 1994: 97; Dicken 1998: 175). 
Governments and firms concerned respectively about economic growth and profitability find 
themselves having to respond in one way or another to the implications of the shifts in the way 
production is becoming increasingly organised.  
 
First, the growing turn to more flexible modes of production has been accompanied by a shift in 
the sources of wealth creation from natural assets such as unskilled or low-skilled labour, land 
and natural resources to ‘created’ assets centred on information, technology and 
management/organisational competencies (Dunning 1993: 6). Although broad generalisations 
need to be made with care, since natural assets remain important in a number of economic 
sectors, it is also evident that technology and skills have become crucial in manufacturing and 
service sectors, particularly in the higher value-added segments (Dicken, 1998). Created assets, 
which tend to be firm specific and thus, potentially mobile, lend considerable structural power to 
global capital. Governments concerned about high value economic growth are increasingly 
                                                           
7 Other interpretations see globalisation as a continuing process of the last 100 years (Hirst 1997: 410), a 
development dating from 1945-50 (Amin 1996: 244-45), or emerging in its ‘fully-fledged’ form since around 1960 
(Scholte 1997a: 19). 
8 See the Research Agenda of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR) at the 
University of Warwick available at: http://www.csgr.org/agenda.html and accessed in July 2001. 
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reliant on the firms that possess these created assets to establish production activities in or 
involving their respective economies, underscoring the crucial importance of FDI, particularly 
for the developing world, and the intense competition for it among governments (Stopford and 
Strange 1991: 1).  
 
Production decisions remain, however, the purview of the global firms that governments are 
increasingly trying to attract (Petrella 1996: 74). Competition for FDI among countries has, 
therefore, become far more intense since governments are all courting essentially the same types 
of firms to their respective economies than in previous times, having adopted broadly similar 
export-centred economic policies. The worldwide liberalising trend has widened the location 
choice available to the firms who own these mobile assets (Stopford and Strange, 1991: 1; 
Dunning, 1993: 13-15). Storper (1997) suggests that particular geographic locations are entirely 
substitutable apart from nominal cost differences. It seems as though economic space worldwide 
is becoming increasingly homogenised with regard to economic policy (Biersteker 1992). 
Although this homogenising trend should not be exaggerated, the point remains that coupled 
with technological advances and the deregulation of financial flows worldwide, production can 
now be located worldwide with considerably more ease than in previous decades. This makes 
competition for FDI likely to be more intense than ever even if the ability of a firm to relocate, 
once established, is more restricted than is commonly presumed. Governments will more than 
ever compete with each other to attract these mobile assets before they become location bound 
once production is established.  
 
Apart from governments, firms too are compelled to respond to the new competition. 
Globalisation has led to a more complex business environment for firms and more intense 
competition, particularly as the ‘coordination and configuration of production chains has become 
the key to creating and sustaining competitive advantage’ (Dicken and Yeung 1999: 118). This 
imposes an enormous burden on emerging firms, especially in the developing world, that are new 
to the game and which also usually lack the ownership-specific assets to compete with well-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
9 Flexible production systems emphasise flexibility of the production process, of its organisation within the factory 
and of relationships with customers and with supplier firms. Dicken (1998: 165-72) and Oman (1994: 86-89) 
provide useful overviews of flexible and fordist production systems. 
 6
established global corporations from the advanced countries in global competition (Stopford and 
Strange 1991: 1-5).  
 
Aside from this, the growing turn to flexible production methods also has implications for the 
manner in which economic space might be reconfigured. On the one hand, it would seem logical 
for firms to have an inherent preference for a global division of labour in line with the 
expansionary logic of capitalism. The turn to flexible production systems, however, may well be 
contributing to a phase of economic agglomeration through global capital’s need for the spatial 
concentration of production activity. The agglomeration logic arises because flexible modes of 
production are highly dependent on physical proximity between producers and suppliers on the 
one hand, and between producers and customers on the other (Oman 1994: 17; Dicken 1998: 
241). Thus, globalisation processes may be helping to re-define economic spaces beyond existing 
notions of territoriality, namely the nation-state, but not necessarily towards a global economic 
space. In short, both centrifugal forces (expansionary logic of capitalism) and centripetal 
tendencies (the agglomeration logic) co-exist in globalisation. Although this does not in any way 
imply in deterministic fashion particular forms of geographical clustering of production 
activities, it does explain the growing prominence of regionally, as opposed to globally, 
integrated production in the world economy (Oman 1994; Dicken 1998: 216-17). In an 
interesting case study, Studer-Noguez (2000) documents how Ford Motor Company’s global 
corporate strategy shifted from one based on a single global production chain dispersed 
worldwide, which proved unworkable, to one that relied on setting up self-contained regionalised 
production chains replicated in different parts of the world. Ford’s revised global corporate 
strategy was, therefore, premised on a number of distinct regional production operations located 
worldwide.  
 
These new forms of production, driven by the shifting corporate strategy of global firms, are 
different from the cross-border economic activity that was prevalent during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Then, MNCs had exploited low labour costs in offshore production sites, producing for export to 
markets outside the region, usually to the industrial world and the MNCs’ home markets. 
Although involving cross-border economic interactions, this form of internationalised economic 
activity did not involve any fundamental reconfiguration of production space. Production was 
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still organised multi-nationally on the basis of territorial nation-states, even if cross-border 
economic interactions were prominent. Since then, the dynamics of global production have 
altered towards an increasingly trans-national production pattern with different segments of a 
single production chain established in a number of sites, often straddling or crossing state 
boundaries. Critics of the globalisation thesis point to the regional clustering of economic 
activity as evidence against the emergence of a single global market place, and thus of 
globalisation as a meaningful or salient phenomenon.10 On the contrary, this paper argues that 
these regionalising tendencies are the very outcomes of globalisation, emerging out of the 
shifting microeconomics of production.  
 
Where such regional clusters emerge depends both on the policies adopted by governments as 
well as on the corporate decisions of firms. Because much of the assets required for production 
are located within firms themselves, firms are theoretically able to relocate worldwide, provided 
local conditions meet with their production needs. Walter (2000: 65) notes that foreign investors 
privilege, among other factors, market size and, unsurprisingly in view of these changing 
production dynamics, ‘access to large regional markets’ in their investment decisions. 
Interestingly, governments may be able to meet firms’ growing need for proximity to regional 
markets through participating in regional cooperation schemes.  
 
The Ideational and Institutional Underpinnings of Globalisation 
Far from being purely a material phenomenon, globalisation is sustained and reinforced by a 
coherent set of by now widely practised neoliberal economic ideas, which are increasingly 
institutionalised through the rules and practices of multilateral institutions, notably the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO).11  
 
The dominant neoliberal ideas underpinning globalisation emphasise and advocate, among other 
things, a free market economy with limited government involvement in and control of economic 
activity through policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation, as well as the ideal of 
market competition. These ideas have become especially prominent from the middle of the 
                                                           
10 Hirst and Thompson (1992), and Weiss (1998: 176-7) employ this line of argument. 
11 Scholte (2000: 34-35) sets out the neoliberal underpinnings of globalisation. 
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1980s, and are widely practised in both the industrial and developing world (Biersteker, 1992) 
although they do not go unchallenged (George 2000). In fact, part of their appeal lies in the 
seemingly simple and effective recipe for growth and wealth creation they offer to governments 
compared to the failed interventionist alternatives tried during the 1960s and 1970s. Then, a 
variety of economic ideas prevailed, ranging from neoclassical ones about free trade and free 
markets, interventionist approaches to economic management, to more radical dependency 
thinking that emphasised withdrawal from the exploitative processes of the world economy. The 
extensive adoption today of neoliberal ideas globally facilitates the worldwide spread of 
economic activity, allowing corporations the flexibility to organise production in whatever 
spatial configuration that best maximises their goals. Although there is growing opposition to 
these neoliberal ideas and practices, they nonetheless retain their considerable influence on state 
actors, and, consequently, play a substantial role in reinforcing the material dimension of 
globalisation.   
 
While neoliberal ideas are a crucial component of and sustain globalisation, at a more 
fundamental level it is perhaps the growing instantiation of ‘globalisation’ itself and of global 
economic competition especially that influences how people respond to global economic change. 
Mittelman (2000: 4) notes that ‘globalisation has become normalised as a dominant set of ideas’. 
Palan and Abbott (1996: 32) argue that perception of globalisation is possibly the main cause for 
changing patterns of behaviour today. Actors, in their view, respond not only to actual external 
pressures or changes, they are increasingly responding to perceived environmental change. This 
is not an unusual point. Perceptions are, after all, of considerable importance in practical politics 
and policymaking (Barry Jones, 1995: 7). Policymakers, as do corporate actors, may respond in 
anticipatory fashion to perceived global market competition to stay one step ahead of the game 
even if there are no immediate or serious market pressures on the economy. We should, however, 
reject the suggestion that only one kind of behaviour is possible – that which accommodates to 
globalisation. Not all governments wish to act out the ‘neoliberal script’ underpinning 
globalisation. Ultimately, actors will respond to these perceptions in ways that are also governed 
by their location within distinct domestic social and political contexts.  
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While governments may be attracted to neoliberal economic ideas that promise simple recipes 
for creating economic wealth for societies – liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation – it is 
becoming difficult for governments to select particular elements from this package of policy 
prescriptions while ignoring others, or even to reject them altogether, should they wish to do so. 
It is increasingly the case that international organisations, especially the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) underwrite 
globalisation processes by developing neoliberal rules to which national governments eventually 
have to conform. Either these rules are binding on governments if they are members of the WTO, 
or governments have to subscribe to the neoliberal policies dictated by the IMF or the World 
Bank in return for financial assistance during economic crises. In short, the post-World War II 
period of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1998: 72-76) has given way since the 1970s to what 
Hoogvelt (1997: 135) terms ‘unembedded liberalism’.  
 
Embedded liberalism allowed governments to intervene in the domestic economy to safeguard 
domestic social stability provided border barriers to international trade were progressively 
reduced. This compromise, which effectively allowed governments to deny market access and 
national treatment to foreign firms if they so wished, began unravelling over a period of time 
beginning from the early 1970s (George 2000). It was only from the mid-1980s, however, that 
new rules in world trade were adopted that redefined, or more precisely markedly reduced the 
purposes for which the government could legitimately intervene in the domestic economy, 
including restricting or discriminating against foreign firms. The new rules consequently 
advanced the interests of the transnational corporations (TNCs) that are key agents of 
globalisation. In short, the neoliberal ideas associated with globalisation have been increasingly 
institutionalised through a multilateral rule-based framework that has substantial authority over 
national governments, especially through the WTO.  
 
To date, the WTO, previously the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been 
perhaps the pre-eminent institutional agent of globalisation, having a more extensive reach both 
in terms of geographical coverage and ever widening scope compared to other global institutions. 
Unlike the IMF, which enters the scene during times of economic distress when governments 
need emergency financial assistance, the WTO is a more constant influence or constraint on 
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national governments and firms. Not only does the WTO boast 144 contracting parties with 
others awaiting entry,12 its functional scope has dramatically expanded and its authority 
strengthened compared to the GATT.  
 
Since the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations of 1986-93 that launched the WTO, disciplines 
addressing intellectual property rights protection, negotiable market access and national 
treatment for foreign service firms, as well as trade-specific investment measures were explicitly 
incorporated into the multilateral trade regime. Rules on domestic competition and investment 
liberalisation are expected to eventually fall under the ambit of the WTO. In these new issue 
areas, rules are expected to prescribe market deregulation while proscribing state intervention in 
the market, thereby constraining government direction of the economy. While the WTO is 
constructed in a way that provides ample opportunity for dissenting governments to veto its 
liberalisation agenda, there are costs to such recalcitrance. Valuable market access concessions 
from industrial countries might not be forthcoming while governments lose credibility in the 
eyes of the corporations that increasingly hold the key to wealth creation.  
 
These trends raise expectations among governments, particularly in the developing world that the 
new rules that will be written into the multilateral trading regime will increasingly restrict the 
rights of governments to intervene in the domestic economy even for what would previously 
have been considered to be legitimate domestic social purposes. While such rules will offer 
TNCs a global trading and production environment that is increasingly tailor-made to their needs 
to pursue ‘maximum profit’ (George 2000: 22), emerging firms from the developing world may 
become increasingly disadvantaged. Should these rules be adopted, developing country 
governments, while obliged to allow foreign firms domestic market access, will become 
increasingly constrained in providing preferential treatment to domestic firms. This, coupled 
with the competitive pressures discussed above, further reinforces perceptions in the developing 
world of globalisation as heightened global market competition. The fear that fledgling firms will 
suffer from direct competition with TNCs is a growing feature in many developing country 
policy circles.  
                                                           
12 As at 1 January 2002.   
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Globalisation: Structure, Process and Agency 
Three points need to be kept in mind from this discussion. First, while globalisation involves the 
reconfiguration of economic space, this does not necessarily imply either re-definition towards a 
global economic space or a single global division of labour, nor the absence of territoriality. 
Instead, the optimal economic space appears to be regional. This is not to suggest a functionalist 
line of explanation for the relationship between regionalism and globalisation. Nevertheless, the 
functional relationship between these two phenomena implies that corporate actors may respond 
positively to regionalism, particularly of the kind that further entrenches globalisation – open 
regionalism. Globalisation, in other words, opens up space for agency, particularly on the part of 
state actors to influence corporate behaviour.  
 
The discussion also identified three sets of potential globalisation pressures that might result in 
the adoption of policies for regional cooperation – material economic pressures, cognitive 
influences, and institutional rules. There is, however, no determining logic that points to open 
regionalism as the only policy response to globalisation. Countervailing tendencies may well 
result in other forms of regionalism, notably the resistance model. Much depends on how actors 
located within domestic social and political contexts respond to the structural pressures 
associated with globalisation on the one hand and to domestic political and social imperatives on 
the other that may collide with the globalisation logic. There are today significant counter-
currents in the world economy that challenge both the neoliberal discourse and globalisation 
itself (Hveem 2000; Mittelman 2000).13 It is in this sense that globalisation is not a stable 
structure or a fully entrenched order, but one that can be challenged.  
 
While it is true that globalisation is partly driven by technological innovations and the 
uncoordinated individual actions of rational economic actors out to maximise economic gains – 
the liberal economics reading – this is not the same as saying that globalisation is an inexorable 
economic force. It is necessary to recognise that globalisation is a process driven by the policy 
choices of a variety of actors – governments, corporations, international organisations and 
                                                           
13 Challenges have increasingly been mounted against globalisation through street protests, for instance during the 
WTO Ministerial in Seattle in 1999, the 2000 IMF/World Bank meetings, the 2001 World Economic Conference at 
Davos and the June 2001 EU Summit in Sweden.  
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individuals – who put in place the necessary institutional structures that support globalisation 
processes (Higgott 1999: 27). What this also implies is the possibility for human agency, 
including that of governments, to manage the process or to attempt to shape it in preferred ways 
(Hirst and Thompson 1995). It is out of such attempts that regionalism emerges in response to 
globalisation. 
 
OPEN REGIONALISM: THE LIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY INTERPRETATION 
  
The preceding discussion suggests that the relationship between globalisation and regionalism 
may be complementary. The outward-looking nature of most contemporary regionalist projects 
leads many observers to surmise that these projects are designed to enhance the participation of 
member countries in global market activity (Gamble and Payne 1996: 251-52). This is the notion 
of ‘open regionalism’, which is a striking contrast to the ‘closed’ regionalism of the 1960s and 
1970s that had been aimed at insulating members from the world economy in line with 
dependency thinking (Grugel and Hout 1999: 10). Open regionalism is the dominant theoretical 
model of the globalisation-regionalism relationship in the literature, as well as the most common 
form of regionalist project found in the contemporary world economy (Mittelman 2000: 126).  
 
Open regionalism, as the term was originally used, meant a form of regionalism based on the 
principles of unilateral liberalisation rather than formally negotiated liberalisation, as well as 
non-discrimination, meaning that regional concessions were offered to both members and non-
members alike (Drysdale and Garnaut 1993: 187-88). While retaining these liberal economic 
underpinnings, the term is now used in a more general sense to characterise regionalist schemes 
that are fundamentally about engaging with globalisation and the global market. Therefore, in 
regionalist schemes characterised as open regionalism, the exchange of preferences among 
regional partners is not accompanied by the imposition of new barriers to non-partners (Gamble 
and Payne 1996: 251). Some scholars also define an open regionalist project as one whose 
members are willing to admit new members into the grouping provided they conform to group 
rules and arrangements (Grugel 1996: 131; Mittelman 2000: 113). 
 
Underwritten by the liberal political economy perspective on IPE, the primacy of economic 
incentives and the search for efficiency and competitiveness is emphasised in explaining open 
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regionalism as a policy response to globalisation. Consequently, much of the literature explains 
open regionalism as a project of governments responding to the needs of corporate actors to 
improve competitiveness in global markets, using regional action as a means to engage with the 
global economy (Grugel and Hout 1999:10; Hveem 2000: 70-74; Mittelman 2000: 121). The 
liberal interpretation also suggests that these projects are likely to include a strong neoliberal 
agenda requiring extensive domestic deregulation, apart from trade liberalisation, aimed at 
reducing the state’s role in economic life in order to yield efficiency gains.14 The effect of such 
actions is to markedly reduce transaction costs for firms engaged in transnational economic 
activities. In short, this form of regionalism – neoliberal regionalism – subordinates the 
economies of member countries to what are seen as the beneficial forces of the global market. 
Aimed at deep engagement with the process of globalisation, open regionalism is an instance of 
‘meso-globalisation’.15 Open regionalism and neoliberal regionalism are often regarded as 
synonymous in the literature.16 
 
This still leaves open the question of why corporate actors and national policymakers would 
advocate a policy of regionalism if their ultimate aim is to engage with the global market. While 
the discussion in the previous section suggests how globalisation may be functionally related to 
regionalism, this does not explain regionalism as a political choice. The liberal perspective 
underpinning the notion of open regionalism provides only limited answers to this question. A 
strict liberal interpretation would, in fact, see global liberalisation to be superior to regional 
liberalisation even if corporate strategies dictate regional production networks as the optimal 
configuration under flexible modes of production. Even if their preference is to organise 
production regionally, global liberalisation allows corporations maximum choice about where to 
invest and in whatever spatial configuration best accommodates the firm’s needs. This is borne 
out by actual trends in the world economy, as the previous discussion made clear. While global 
corporations today tend to organise production on a regional basis, locating regionalised 
production operations in different parts of the world, this is usually part of a global strategy.  
 
                                                           
14 See Van Apeldoorn (2000) who discusses neoliberal regionalism in relation to the European Union. 
15 See Phillips (2000: 286, fn 7) who attributes the idea of ‘meso-globalisation’ to Richard Higgott.  
16 See, for instance, Mittelman (2000: 112-13, 126). 
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The regime literature (neoliberal institutionalism), a variant of the liberal perspective, provides 
an answer to the ‘why regionalism?’ question by suggesting that governments opt for 
regionalism because cooperation is easier to negotiate with smaller numbers than would be the 
case for negotiating global liberalisation (Oye 1985). Regionalism is a solution to the collective 
action problems that impede cooperation among large numbers. Moreover, by creating both an 
incentive and a potential bargaining tool for further negotiations, regional cooperation can 
potentially advance global liberalisation (Oye 1992). Liberal readings of regionalism thus see the 
phenomenon as a building block to global liberalisation. This particular interpretation suggests 
that we are likely to see ever-widening processes of regionalism as more and more nation-states 
are brought into existing regional projects in an effort to build up global liberalisation (Mittelman 
2000: 113). Regionalism, then, constitutes an efficient but possibly interim approach to global 
liberalisation.  
 
Although providing useful insights into the globalisation-regionalism relationship, liberal 
interpretations of regionalism are, nonetheless, limited because they lack a realistic notion of 
international politics. The decision to participate in regionalism is made in order to subordinate 
the national economy to what are seen as the given and beneficial forces of the global market. In 
this liberal model, regionalism involves very little purposeful political action by governments of 
states to attempt to intervene in globalisation processes – in short, the absence of any notion of 
political struggle, both domestically and externally. Instead, governments acquiesce in and act in 
accordance with the logic of global market forces asserted through the pressure of market 
competition. This simplifies considerably the nature of the international political economy, while 
also privileging structurally derived interests in explanation. There is an implied coincidence of 
interests between state actors and those businesses in favour of (regional/global) liberalisation, 
with both sets of actors responding similarly to the pressures of global market competition. The 
liberal perspective is silent on domestic distributive issues, since in the liberal world the search 
for efficiency and the resultant economic growth leads to gains for all in the long run.  
 
Like its circumscribed characterisation of the international political economy, the neglect of the 
distribution question is a serious limitation of the liberal political economy reading of 
regionalism. Moreover, its’ framing of the relationship between state and corporate actors is 
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overly simplistic. In particular settings, the distinction between foreign-owned and domestic-
owned capital is often the more salient one, rather than between inward-focused and outward-
oriented businesses. Although broad generalisations need to be made with care, domestic-owned 
capital in particular political settings is often harnessed to attain vital domestic social and 
political goals aimed at by political leaders while foreign capital addresses the broad growth 
priorities of national governments. For this reason, it is important to take seriously domestic 
distributive dynamics. In parts of the world, Southeast Asia for instance, domestic-owned capital 
is central to domestic distributive agendas. In settings such as this, governments may well 
respond to globalisation in ways that attempt to preserve and/or nurture domestic capital, 
particularly if emerging domestic capital that is also politically important is in danger of losing 
out to global capital in market competition under conditions of globalisation. To the extent that 
such responses include regionalism as a policy choice, the nature of the regionalist project 
adopted is likely to differ from the liberal model of open regionalism.  
 
REGIONALISM AS RESISTANCE TO GLOBALISATION: LEGITIMACY AND 
DOMESTIC POLITICS  
 
The second ideal-type model of the globalisation-regionalism relationship in the literature 
explicitly brings in the domestic level, and is thus a useful corrective to the basic model of open 
regionalism that focuses on systemic level forces only. Although encompassing a range of 
variations, the essential feature of the resistance model is that it seeks to preserve through 
regionalism particular forms of national policy instruments or domestic social and economic 
arrangements that are difficult to sustain individually amidst globalisation (Mittelman 2000: 116-
30). The resistance model thus emphasises concern with non-economic or social values like 
distribution and social justice as the main driving force for regionalism, in contrast to the basic 
model of open regionalism that emphasises the search for efficiency and competitiveness as a 
key driving force. Although systemic forces – globalisation – do come into the picture, the 
response to them – resistance regionalism – is mediated through the domestic political economy.  
 
Legitimacy is usually an underlying concern for policymakers contemplating this form of 
regionalism (Hveem 2000: 75-8; Mittelman 2000: 116-30). Governments, deriving political 
legitimacy from their capacity to undertake traditional social responsibilities for the societies 
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they govern, may be compelled to turn to regional collective action as the only viable option to 
maintain national social/economic arrangements like the welfare state apparatus (Hirst and 
Thompson 1996: 162). Globalisation arguably makes such arrangements more costly to maintain 
at the national level. Kurzer, for instance, suggests that the future of national social democratic 
economic systems and re-distributive policies in European countries lies in a European regional 
project (Kurzer 1993: 254).  
 
Notwithstanding the theoretical possibility of the resistance model, most instances of regionalism 
in the world economy today are examples of open regionalism, including the European Union 
(Mittelman 2000: 126).17 Nevertheless, there is always the possibility of a dialectical process 
emerging out of globalisation to challenge the neoliberal trend in regionalism. The resistance 
model may consequently emerge as an empirical feature as regional projects originally designed 
to engage fully with globalisation are themselves challenged by domestic groups suffering the 
effects of regional liberalisation, particularly if social protection or compensatory measures are 
unavailable as a result of neoliberal approaches to market liberalisation (Higgott 2000: 80-81). 
Neoliberal regionalism consequently may challenge the authority and legitimacy of governments 
under these conditions. In such instances, governments may attempt to withdraw from the 
regionalist project, or alternatively seek to change the project’s original terms and conditions. 
The tendency to use regionalism to ride on globalisation may not be a lasting one (Hveem 2000: 
71). Regionalism should, therefore, not be viewed only in static terms as the outcome of a one-
off decision to cooperate. New forms of regionalism could emerge from what was originally a 
neoliberal project, especially if the re-negotiation option is adopted rather than outright 
abandonment of the project.  
 
Although offering an alternative to the model of open regionalism through emphasising the 
domestic legitimacy concerns of governments, the resistance model unfortunately imposes a 
separation of economics and politics by conceptualising growth or efficiency (economics), the 
primary goal of open regionalism, and legitimacy (politics) as opposed to one another. This is 
because the analysis of domestic politics in the resistance model does not extend to uncover the 
                                                           
17 On the European Union, see Van Apeldoorn (2000).  
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bases of legitimacy. Instead, this model adopts a somewhat Euro-centric understanding of 
legitimacy based on the European welfare state. If we explore the dynamics of political 
legitimacy in other settings, we may find that in certain political contexts, growth/efficiency and 
legitimacy may be closely interrelated, and complementary rather than opposed. Much, 
therefore, depends on the sources of political legitimacy in a particular society.  
 
Again, the example of Southeast Asia illustrates this point particularly well. In this setting, it is 
governments’ ability to deliver material economic well-being, in addition to social and political 
stability, that accords them legitimacy, rather than representation and process as in liberal, 
western democracies (Stubbs 2001: 50; Alagappa 1995: 330; Castells 1992: 59-60). In these 
countries, high rates of economic growth not only satisfy mass aspirations to material well-being 
they also allow elites to maintain their right to rule (Case 1996: 18). In such instances, the 
presumed tension between legitimacy and growth/efficiency is either relieved or at least, 
reduced. Concern with legitimacy could thus entrench open regionalist projects if these 
contribute to growth rather than result in challenges to them. Clearly, we need to pay closer 
attention to domestic state-society relations that help us to identity what the bases of legitimacy 
are, and the conditions under which growth or efficiency considerations prevail over distributive 
agendas, and vice versa.  
 
CONCEPTUAL GAINS FROM THE ECONOMIC REALIST PERSPECTIVE ON IPE 
 
As already noted, the two models of regionalism offer a limited treatment of the political 
relationship between states and markets (both the domestic and the global market) as well as 
with other states. In open regionalism, global market forces are taken as a given and are regarded 
as benign, conferring benefits on all states in a positive-sum manner. State actors engage in 
regionalism because it is an efficient means of facilitating the integration of the national economy 
with the global economy. The resistance model, in contrast, explains regionalism as an attempt to 
block global market forces.  
 
Proponents of economic realism, for instance, would dispute the liberal reading of the 
international economic order. This theoretical perspective regards the global economy as an 
inherently political space in which economic interactions and activities reflect redistributive, 
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zero-sum games (Barry Jones 1995: 19-43). By doing so, it allows for the possibility of human 
agency as actors try and manipulate prevailing patterns of economic activity and economic 
relations in order to gain an increasing share of the benefits of global market activity. While the 
structuralist perspective on IPE would share some of these ideas about agency, it displays a 
strong element of economic determinism with actions and outcomes in international politics 
driven by the logic of global capitalism and the state acting as the instrument of capital. States 
are not seen as political communities in their own right but merely as constituent units of a world 
capitalistic system (Hoogvelt 1997: 8). This makes it somewhat difficult to introduce into 
analysis domestic political priorities not deriving from the capitalist mode of production. On the 
other hand, the economic realist perspective offers greater scope in modelling the relationship 
between globalisation and regionalism. It depicts a more ‘realistic’ notion of world politics while 
also allowing us to integrate domestic politics into analysis in a conceptually consistent manner.   
 
The economic realist view of nation-states as independent political communities, 
notwithstanding their interdependent relations with other states and with non-state actors, is one 
that accords with much real world dynamics (Gilpin 1987: 46). Another central argument of 
economic realism is that ‘states seek to influence markets to their own individual advantage’, 
making the geographic location of economic activities their leading concern (Gilpin 1987: 47-
9).18  This implies that governments are likely to marshal ‘power’ in an attempt to interfere in 
global markets to attain the interests of their respective states in competition with other states, or 
in response to non-state actors such as TNCs in the global system. For smaller, less powerful 
states, this can occur through cooperation between similarly situated states for instance, in much 
the same way that alliance formation meets the shared strategic interests of a group of states vis-
à-vis other state(s). This particular view of agency in the international political economy concurs 
with classical realist thinking. Morgenthau, for instance, acknowledged that states have the 
potential to transform the international system ‘through the workmanlike manipulation of the 
perennial forces that have shaped the past as they will the future’ (Morgenthau 1948/85: 12).19 
Economic realism recognises, therefore, that state actors can attempt to, and often do manipulate 
                                                           
18 Gilpin refers to this perspective as economic nationalism.  
 19
inter-state politics to try and influence some aspect of the international political economy. While 
the actual success of such agendas may be limited, especially in the case of developing countries, 
nevertheless by allowing for the possibility of purposeful action the economic realist perspective 
re-introduces the political into liberal frameworks of regionalism.  
 
Modifying Understandings of Open Regionalism: The FDI Variant 
As it was noted previously, the economic realist perspective offers valuable insights into the 
globalisation-regionalism relationship based on the notion that there is room for ‘purposeful 
action to alter or transform prevailing patterns of economic capability and advantage’ (Barry 
Jones 1995: 31). This point of view suggests that even in the case of open regionalism where 
governments seek engagement with the global economy, governments may be using regionalism 
in a purposeful manner to manipulate particular aspects of globalisation processes to benefit the 
state and its society, or particular members of the political community. It encompasses the idea 
that governments are not always totally helpless in the face of globalisation, and may find the 
space to engage in actions through cooperation that alter or interfere with global market 
outcomes in certain desired ways.  
 
Mittelman (2000: 133) alludes to this when he suggests that the logic of global capital, namely 
its tendency to engage in regional production, offers nation-states an incentive to collaborate ‘to 
attain market shares and augment trading and investment opportunities’. Regionalism, thus, 
presents one means to help re-direct beneficial global capital to the region in question through 
the carrot of the single regional market. As the previous discussion has shown, corporate actors 
are likely to respond positively to the presence of regional markets when deciding where to 
invest. In such instances, open regionalism is driven less by narrower concerns with economic 
efficiency and more by concerns with attracting FDI, which is a key source of economic growth 
for many countries. It is an agenda that is likely to appeal to developing countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
19 The economic realist perspective on IPE derives from the classical realist tradition in IR, specifically state-centric 
realism rather than system-centred realism or Waltzian neorealism. Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr are the 
contemporary intellectual pioneers of classical realism. 
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Governments may respond to the structural power of transnational or global production capital20 
by actively using regionalism to attract new production capital to the region and through that 
process to individual national economies. Developing countries, usually with limited indigenous 
capabilities for global production, often look to attracting TNCs that do possess these assets to 
their respective economies. In a situation where FDI can theoretically locate in a variety of sites, 
developing countries will want to prevent the potential loss of these wealth-creating assets 
owned by TNCs to other locations. TNCs may not be involved in direct lobbying or bargaining 
with governments, but policymakers are likely to make policies with this thought – the need to 
attract or retain global capital – in mind. Although this may be accomplished though providing a 
more liberal national regulatory environment for investors, market size and access to large 
regional markets are among the main criteria now influencing the decision about where to invest.  
 
Engaging in regional cooperation, thus, allows governments to exploit global capital’s functional 
preference for regional markets. Policymakers are likely to respond with a policy of regionalism 
to external developments that are seen as having the potential to divert investment away from the 
national economy, provided they recognise the potential of regionalism in retaining or attracting 
production capital. They may become aware of the potential of regionalism as a magnet for FDI 
once they realise that foreign investors are registering strong interest in and are actually investing 
in regionalist projects established elsewhere. This is the contagion explanation of regionalism 
highlighted by Ravenhill (2001: 15).  
 
Regionalist projects driven primarily by the desire to attract global capital are instances of open 
regionalism to the extent that they are about engaging with globalisation processes. In that sense 
both economic realist and liberal theoretical perspectives provide similar readings of 
regionalism. These contrasting perspectives offer distinct views on two issues, however – the 
precise form or features of the regionalist project and its likely future trajectory.  
 
Regionalist projects designed primarily to attract FDI need not necessarily encompass the strong 
neoliberal, deregulatory agenda often associated with neoliberal regionalist projects driven by 
                                                           
20 The structural power of capital rests on the ability of capital owners to deny investment (Lindblom 1977). 
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efficiency concerns. The overriding concern in the former is more broadly with economic 
growth.21 Efficiency is attained to the extent that the incoming capital operates efficiently, but 
the regionalist project is not necessarily underpinned by neoliberal ideas nor associated with a 
strong neoliberal agenda. There is substantial empirical evidence that foreign investors privilege 
other factors above the policy regime when making investment decisions, although they would 
clearly prefer less to more government intervention in markets (Walter 2000). Provided key areas 
of economic life that are crucial for foreign investors are relatively unrestricted, such as trade 
flows and financial regulations on profit repatriation, investors appear able to live with some 
degree of government restriction in markets.22 Regionalism primarily motivated by the desire to 
draw in FDI may therefore display only limited neoliberal characteristics. These projects are best 
termed ‘embedded neoliberal projects’.23 While they are, nonetheless, instances of open 
regionalism designed to remain engaged with global market forces, these projects are entirely 
consistent with a degree of government intervention in markets.  
 
An economic realist reading of open regionalism also suggests that the prospects for extending 
the regionalist project to include new members will be contingent. Since regionalism is directed 
at offering global capital a distinct functional space of production, extending the project to new 
members could weaken the distinctiveness of the original regional project. This will be 
especially the case if the new member is itself a very attractive site for FDI, potentially able to 
draw in substantial amounts of incoming FDI with limited spillover benefits to other members in 
the project through vertical and horizontal production linkages. Although there is always an 
element of competition among the members of a regional project for incoming FDI, the presence 
of complementarities among members usually ensures some form of balance is achieved. In 
contrast, regional projects involving a group of small countries may not necessarily benefit from 
the membership of a large country such as China, which itself effectively offers foreign capital a 
                                                           
21 While the relationship between efficiency and growth is a close one, growth can, nevertheless, proceed in the 
presence of some level of economic inefficiency by simply increasing inputs of the factors of production, notably 
labour or capital. Efficiency pertains to maximising output and returns from a given amount of inputs.  
22 This does not necessarily stop TNCs from lobbying for neoliberal policies, particularly through multilateral 
organisations.  
23 The notion of ‘embedded neoliberal’ regionalism is borrowed from van Apeldoorn (2000: 241) who uses it to 
describe the emerging European regional order in which the state continues to play a role in the provision of public 
goods like education and infrastructure. The original term, embedded neoliberalism, comes from Ruggie (1998: 72-
76). 
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‘regional’ site of production by virtue of its size and wide-ranging industrial complementarities. 
There is a strong possibility that foreign investors may prefer to establish production networks 
within the Chinese territory but trade the resultant output to the other members of the regional 
scheme, thus defeating the purpose of the regional exercise for its original members. The benefits 
of extending FDI-centred regional projects to new members are not unequivocal, unlike the case 
of efficiency-driven neoliberal regionalism. 
 
Although the dominant open regionalist model emphasises globally oriented capital in analysis, 
with foreign capital a key focus in the FDI variant, domestic capital is thus far invisible. There is 
little attempt to consider the relationship between governments or political/state actors and 
fractions of capital distinguished by their ownership – domestic or foreign-owned capital. The 
conventional focus in the literature has usually been on segments of capital distinguished by their 
market orientation, either towards the domestic market or the international market.24 Although it 
may be increasingly difficult to distinguish business in terms of its nationality – the ‘who is us?’ 
question posed by Robert Reich (1991: 304) – such a distinction, nevertheless, remains relevant 
in particular political contexts where policymakers and politicians do consciously make this 
distinction for various political reasons. In these settings, and this is especially true for 
developing countries where domestic capital is usually not as well developed as foreign capital 
but often plays a crucial social/political role, governments may well respond to globalisation in 
ways that attempt to preserve and nurture domestic capital. Clearly, we need to consider 
theoretically plausible models of regionalism in which domestic capital is accorded analytical 
priority. 
 
Developmental Regionalism: Privileging Domestic Capital  
Making an analytical distinction between foreign and domestic capital reveals a fourth model of 
regionalism, what I call ‘developmental’ regionalism. Deriving from the notion of the 
developmental state, developmental regionalism encapsulates the developmental state idea of 
                                                           
24 See, for instance, Gourevitch (1978). 
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state intervention in markets to promote national development agendas,25 in this case by adopting 
an approach to regionalism through which to nurture emerging domestic firms to eventually 
become internationally competitive. This is achieved through two instruments: one, the expanded 
regional market generated through inter-state cooperation and two, temporary protection or 
privileges for domestic capital in this expanded market. According to strategic trade theory from 
the international economics discipline, both measures can help to secure benefits for domestic 
firms over their foreign competitors.26  
 
Insights from Paul Krugman’s ‘import protection as export promotion’ strategic trade model 
reveal that when a domestic firm is given a privileged position in the home market, it enjoys an 
advantage in scale over foreign rivals that enables the firm to realise ‘learning by doing’ benefits 
(Krugman 1984). A larger protected home market offers greater dynamic scale and learning 
effects to the privileged firm. This suggests that by according selective protection or privileges to 
domestic firms in an expanded market generated through regional collaboration, regionalism 
could theoretically be used as an instrument to help develop competitive domestic industries.27  
Developmental regionalism is clearly in the economic realist tradition, encompassing as it does 
the idea of state activism in both the international system (inter-state collaboration) and at the 
domestic level (privileged treatment of domestic firms) to manipulate or direct economic activity 
to serve the perceived interests of the state.   
 
                                                           
25 The notion of the developmental state goes beyond this, of course. The developmental state is often 
conceptualised in terms of a set of institutional features of the state and its relationship to society. See Woo-Cumings 
(1999).  
26 Strategic trade theory derives its conclusions from assumptions that depart from those of neoclassical trade theory: 
that markets display increasing returns to scale, that learning effects or the experience of firms is important, and that 
technological innovations matter (Helpman and Krugman 1985: 3; Brander, 1986: 25; Krugman 1986: 8). Under 
these imperfect market conditions, an interventionist trade policy is shown to secure welfare gains for the country 
(Brander and Spencer 1985; Krugman, 1986: 12-14; McCulloch, 1993: 49-50).  
27 Although Gamble and Payne (1996: 252) advance the idea of ‘strategic trade’ regionalism, this model is 
fundamentally distinct from the model of developmental regionalism advanced in this paper. Crucially, the former 
does not make a distinction between domestic and foreign firms. In Gamble and Payne’s model, whatever sheltering 
of firms producing within the regional scheme comes from the higher effective price of extra-regional imports. It is 
fundamentally a model of open regionalism, as the authors themselves acknowledge. Likewise, Mittelman’s (2000: 
116-17) development integration model of regionalism is also fundamentally distinct from the notion of 
developmental regionalism advanced here. Mittelman’s model involves explicit state allocation of regional industrial 
projects among regional members, which is not a feature of developmental regionalism. Mittelman’s model is more 
likely to have been a central feature of the ‘closed’ regionalist schemes of the 1960s and 1970s centred on finding 
expanded markets for import-substitution industrialisation. 
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We may regard the concern with domestic capital as a preoccupation with distribution, or with 
the selective allocation of economic benefits including rents to domestic businesses, in contrast 
with the generalised growth/efficiency imperative that underpins open regionalism. Nevertheless, 
concern with growth is not entirely absent in developmental regionalism. Rather, the growth 
imperative is infused with distributive concerns. Developmental regionalism is, therefore, not 
about resisting globalisation completely, but neither is it about complete acquiescence to global 
market forces. Instead, it encompasses a period of temporary and limited resistance to aspects of 
globalisation through which attempts are made to build capabilities to enable domestic 
businesses to eventually participate in global market activities. This model of regionalism, 
therefore, allows us to consider departures from open regionalism as representing a distinct 
approach to regionalism rather than merely as inconsistencies in open regionalism or as instances 
of protectionism.  
 
The question that remains, however, is why political actors would seek to respond to 
globalisation via nurturing domestic capital. Why would they prefer to maximise the wealth of a 
segment of society instead of maximising the wealth and efficiency in society as a whole through 
full embrace of global corporations, arguably the primary source of wealth creation in the global 
economy? In fact, we should extend this question to also ask why and under what conditions 
state actors would opt for a form of regionalism that privileges FDI instead of the neoliberal or 
the developmental versions.  
 
A strict realist interpretation would see state authorities seeking consciously to manipulate 
patterns of economic activity for strategic, power-political purposes, and may plausibly apply to 
the interactions of the major powers and potential strategic rivals like the US, Japan, or the EU. 
Thus, Japan’s drive to develop domestic industries after the Second World War has been 
described as mercantilist, or economic realist, in design and motivation, while the responses of 
the US and the EU to the ‘rise’ of Japan in the 1980s is argued to reflect competitive, zero-sum 
political dynamics among strategic rivals. The push to complete the Single European Market has 
been explained in terms of European attempts to counter through regionalism the strategic 
economic threat from Japan, particularly in high technology sectors. Such arguments, however, 
are less applicable in other settings, the developing world for instance, where outcomes are more 
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likely to be driven by concerns rooted in the domestic political economy rather than by any 
meaningful concern with inter-state power political competition. This line of thinking is not such 
a radical departure from realist ideas about national security. Security for developing states is 
generally framed in terms of the security of domestic political institutions and governing regimes 
(Ayoob 1995: 8). The realist tradition, after all, does not completely ignore the domestic level, 
unlike its neorealist counterpart.28 As such, it is conceptually consistent to argue that an 
economic realist external orientation may be underpinned or driven by domestic regime security 
imperatives more specifically, and domestic political determinants more broadly.  
 
This paper, therefore, advocates paying closer attention to the domestic level in explaining the 
turn to regionalism, a call already made by many scholars of regionalism. The FDI variant of 
open regionalism and developmental regionalism are both informed by economic realist insights, 
in that they represent attempts at manipulating in one way or another global market forces. 
Nevertheless, the interests driving proponents of these forms of regionalism should be 
conceptualised in terms of domestic political dynamics rather than inter-state power political 
competition as in strict realist thinking. Thus, this paper advances the argument that the type of 
regional project that emerges in response to globalisation, and this paper has identified four such 
ideal-type models (see Table 1), will be determined by domestic political economic dynamics, 
even for regional projects that are ultimately about engaging with globalisation. This is because 
external events, globalisation pressures for instance, acquire ‘political significance’ through 
domestic politics (Jacobsen 1996: 94). 
 
                                                           
28 See the discussion in Ayoob (1998: 39-40) and Williams (1996: 215). Morgenthau emphasises the importance of 
domestic context in shaping state interests in international politics. 
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Table 1: Four models of the globalisation-regionalism relationship 
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INCORPORATING THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
 
Political actors everywhere are usually confronted by the choice of adopting policies that 
maximise wealth in society as a whole or that benefit particularistic interests; in other words, 
between concern over growth or over domestic distributive priorities. Distribution is defined in 
this paper as the conscious allocation by governments of income, rents and other economic 
benefits to particular individuals, groups or firms who would otherwise not have received these 
gains through the workings of the free market.29 Policy responses to external events, including 
choices about regionalism, are quite likely to involve tension between the growth and distributive 
imperatives. In most domestic settings, economic policies, including foreign economic policies, 
are influenced by these basic priorities, with policymakers driven by whichever goal best secures 
their chances of remaining in power. Which priority dominates – growth or distribution – will 
depend on the political costs to incumbent leaders of adopting policy choices that emphasise/de-
emphasise one or the other goal, and thus, will be contingent on prevailing economic as well as 
political circumstances. It will also depend on the nature of political legitimacy.  
 
This requires closer attention to be paid to the nature of domestic politics in distinct settings, a 
point emphasised by scholars of IPE who have called for more studies of regionalism outside the 
European and North American settings as a way to pay attention to contextual factors (Payne 
1998). To put another way, not only does the domestic level matter in explanations of 
regionalism, the precise nature of domestic politics is also crucial. While it may be true that 
political elites everywhere generally depend on these two key policy instruments – growth and 
distribution – to maintain themselves in power, nevertheless, distinct domestic social and 
political settings often determine which particular groups are privileged in the distributive 
agenda of political elites, including which segment of capital, and the conditions under which 
this takes place. In short, it is dynamics at the domestic level that are likely to determine when 
political elites favour (a) globally oriented capital; (b) foreign-owned capital; or (c) domestic-
owned capital, which in turn shapes the course and nature of regionalism to the extent that the 
                                                           
29 The concept of distribution used in this paper does not incorporate any normative connotation. It is not to be seen 
as an egalitarian act, as something that is inherently ‘progressive’ involving the allocation of material and other 
benefits from rich to poor. As Susan Strange notes, distribution may well involve the ‘regressive’ reallocation of 
wealth, from the poor to the rich (Strange 1988/94: 212-3), and in the context of this paper, to partners of ruling 
elites as the latter attempt to maintain elite cohesion and their power base. 
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regional option is adopted as a policy choice. The Southeast Asian case discussed below 
illustrates especially clearly the conditions under which distinct segments of capital might be 
privileged. 
 
The Southeast Asian context  
Although political systems in Southeast Asia range from democracies, to semi-democracies and 
authoritarian regimes, countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Singapore share the basic characteristics of elite governance political systems where political 
power is largely in the hands of elites despite the presence of mechanisms for citizen 
participation (McCargo 1998: 127).30 In these countries, the political elite is, however, not 
completely insulated from domestic society and needs to respond to concerns arising from this 
level in order to maintain elite rule and its legitimacy, which remains fragile to date.  
 
On the one hand, political elites need the support of citizens to maintain their right to rule and to 
ensure political order, and this is largely achieved through creating material wealth for citizens – 
the notion of performance legitimacy, which remains salient in Southeast Asia (Alagappa 1995: 
330; Stubbs 2001). This explains the preoccupation of political leaders with securing and 
maintaining key sources of growth in the economy, of which FDI is pre-eminent in this regional 
setting. On the other hand, elite rule is also sustained by unity and accommodation between 
members of the elite/governing coalition (Haggard and Kaufman 1997).  In a number of 
Southeast Asian countries, political elites often selectively distribute economic benefits to their 
elite partners as a primary means to achieve elite unity.  
 
By the 1990s, it was the accommodation between the political elite and an emerging domestic 
business class that was crucial. The material and other forms of political support provided by 
domestic businesses help incumbent political elites maintain their power base, while the former 
in turn receive economic privileges through preferential policies instituted by the latter. In 
addition, domestic businesses are often privileged because they helped political actors fulfil 
broader social equity goals in society. This is especially clear in the Malaysian and Indonesian 
                                                           
30 Elite governance is most usefully viewed as a project whose principal aim is to maintain elite power, autonomy 
and exclusivity (Case 1996: 20; McCargo 1998: 127). 
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cases, where political legitimacy also rests on the capacity of the state to develop respectively an 
ethnic Malay and indigenous Indonesian domestic capital class, particularly to offset the 
dominance of ethnic Chinese capital.31 There is also a wider distributive agenda in parts of 
Southeast Asia that may lead policymakers to privilege non-elite or broad social groups in policy 
choices, provided these represent key constituencies for ruling elites and vital to sustaining elite 
rule and the stability of the regime (see Figure 1).  
 
The importance of the distributive agenda in maintaining elite unity does not imply that 
economic growth is unimportant. Even though economic distress is not the primary source of 
factional or inter-elite conflicts, it is likely to exacerbate them. Fewer internal divisions within 
the ruling elite are likely when economic growth is strong. Declining economic performance 
often disrupts the political bargains rulers typically forge with other elite groups in society (Case 
1996: 17-20). Under these circumstances, political elites are unable to provide their elite partners 
with the basic conditions that support wealth creation, while the latter become unable or 
unwilling to continue to offer material and political support to ruling incumbents. The end result 
is a weakening of elite cohesion and the power base of incumbent elites, while opposition groups 
gain from the defection of business and other elites previously aligned with the incumbents 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1997: 267-68). Political elites, therefore, often have to engage in difficult 
balancing acts in their policy choices, particularly when these involve significant trade-offs 
between the growth and distributive imperatives, or between maximising wealth and efficiency 
in society as a whole and maximising the wealth of a segment of society.  
 
                                                           
31 See Crouch (1996) for Malaysia and Habir (1999) for Indonesia. 
 30
Figure 1  
The role of growth and distribution in elite governance political systems 
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    Core Elite Goals  
    Maintenance of elite rule (especially incumbents); 
    Security and stability of the domestic  




In much of Southeast Asia, foreign capital remains a key source of growth and exports, 
particularly in the high value-added and advanced sectors of the economy that virtually all 
governments are increasingly targeting, although domestic-owned firms are not entirely absent 
from this picture. On the other hand, the distributive imperative, where it exists, is usually aimed 
at privileging domestic-owned capital or segments of it that are also close allies of the political 
elite. More specifically, it is emerging domestic capital that will most likely need to be nurtured, 
rather than internationally oriented domestic-owned capital. Thus, it is when the political elite is 
closely allied to inward-focused or emerging domestic capital that the tension between growth 
and distribution becomes pronounced. Policymakers may well adopt measures to protect, 
preserve and/or nurture emerging domestic capital vis-à-vis foreign capital if external pressures 
are perceived to be threatening to this particular segment of domestic capital.  
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Such pressures may come from multilateral institutions. The WTO, for instance, continues to try 
and incorporate investment rules within its agenda although this is rejected by many developing 
countries (Khor 2001). This attempt is increasingly perceived in parts of the world as a means to 
maximise the rights of TNCs to operate freely worldwide, and is regarded as detrimental to the 
future of emerging domestic capital. To the extent that policymakers regard such external 
developments to be detrimental to the future of domestic-owned capital, then they might well 
adopt a developmental approach to regionalism along the lines suggested in this paper.  
 
This was, in fact, the case in Southeast Asia. When the members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) formally incorporated an investment liberalisation component 
programme within the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) project in 1998, they opted to accord 
full national treatment and market access privileges to foreign (non-ASEAN) investors at least 
ten years later than to domestic or ASEAN national investors. This is explained as an attempt at 
developmental regionalism, a response by certain member governments of ASEAN to secure the 
future of emerging domestic capital perceived to be at the losing end should a global investment 
regime become a reality, which these governments expected would occur sooner rather than 
later. The concern was greatest with regard to domestic capital that was closely allied to the 
political/ruling elite and vital to broader social/political goals in the countries concerned 
(Nesadurai 2003, forthcoming). On the other hand, we are likely to see the FDI variant of open 
regionalism if policymakers are primarily driven by the need for FDI and the growth imperative. 
The point to note is that policymakers may adopt distinct forms of regional projects depending 




The analytical framework suggested in this paper, which combines the economic realist 
perspective on IPE with a model of domestic politics, offers substantial analytical purchase over 
liberal perspectives in explaining regionalism as an outcome of globalisation. The value of 
economic realism as a theoretical tool comes from its recognition that states continue to matter, 
and more importantly, that the governments of these states can, and often do consciously 
manipulate inter-state relations to try and intervene in the international political economy in line 
with domestic interests. Regionalism can be interpreted as one such instrument for states to pool 
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their resources in order to influence the international political economy. By using the economic 
realist theoretical perspective, it was possible to first, identify two variants of open regionalism, 
and second, to advance a fourth ideal-type model of the globalisation-regionalism relationship in 
addition to the two existing ideal-types in the literature, namely developmental regionalism (see 
Table 1). These four distinct models differ in terms of how they engage with globalisation, their 
relationship with different segments of capital and with other social groups, whether driven by 
growth, efficiency or distributive concerns, and their key features.  
 
Although globalisation may provide the primary stimulus for regionalism, it is clear that 
attention must be paid to the domestic level in order to explain what form the regional option 
might take. A key assumption of the paper is that governments respond in the first instance to 
domestically derived political priorities. In short, it is dynamics operating at the domestic level 
that determine which of the four ideal-type models of regionalism outlined in this paper will 
emerge in response to globalisation, even though the push towards regionalism comes from 
systemic forces. These dynamics centre on the tension between a growth imperative and a 
domestic distributive imperative. The specific case of Southeast Asian domestic politics was 
highlighted to illustrate the conditions under which one or another of these priorities operates in 
this particular setting, which consequently will have implications for the type of regionalist 
project that is likely to be adopted in response to the pressures associated with globalisation.  
 
To summarise, the type of regionalism that emerges as a result of globalisation is mediated by 
domestic political economy dynamics centred on the tension between growth/efficiency concerns 
on the one hand and distributive priorities on the other, even in the case of regionalist projects 
that seek engagement with globalisation. Political and state actors interpret external events and 
developments – globalisation – through lenses grounded in domestic political priorities, which 
also influence their responses to these external impulses, including their particular approaches to 
regionalism. As a growing number of IR scholars argue, external events acquire ‘political 
significance only as they are factored into national politics in ways that accommodate the 
interests, strategies and ideologies of dominant local players’ (Jacobsen 1996: 94-5). The 
domestic level is clearly a crucial mediating factor between globalisation and regional outcomes. 
Breslin and Higgott’s (2000: 341) call for a ‘marriage between the disciplinary approaches of the 
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theorist of regionalism and the richer empirical work which recognises the importance of specific 
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